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**An FRE-led  
Insurgency Strategy  
to Defeat  
the Iraqi Transitional Government  
(A Red Cell Assessment)**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Red Cell

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## ***Insurgent Targets of Opportunity – 2005***

- The next 10 months will present many opportunities to disrupt Iraq's move toward institutionalizing majority rule
  - TNA Convening in February
  - Provincial Governments seating in March / April
  - ITG Standup in March / April
- 
- Seating of the Federal Supreme Court in March / April
  - Constitution development process – April - August
  - Constitutional Referendum – October
  - National Elections – December
  - Coalition Forces / ISF / Collaborators -- Always

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## *Defeating the ITG*

### Insurgent Intentions

- **Attack to disrupt, delay, or deny seating of the Transitional National Assembly (TNA)**
  - Deny momentum to new Assembly
- **Intimidate, coerce, or assassinate TNA members to prevent formation of ITG**
  - Focus on TNA leadership—Presidency Council, Sunni leadership, and Constitution committee
- **Attack ITG as it is forming; take advantage of inexperienced ministries and security forces**
  - Provoke incoming ITG to employ exclusionary, oppressive measures against Sunni Arabs
  - Attack infrastructure to affect population's quality of life
  - Work IO campaign emphasizing that TNA is unrepresentative and ineffective, and supported by the occupiers

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## **Targeting the TNA**

### **Announcement of Winners (Pre-TNA)**

- **Target winners and families at their homes**
  - Strike before proper security measures can be put in place
  - Intimidate representatives into not participating; kidnap or kill those who ignore warnings
- **Attack Convention Center with mortars and rockets ahead of assembly day**
  - Make it unsafe to meet there; force TNA to meet at less secure location
- **Draw headlines away from election results and TNA**
  - Emphasize government ineffectiveness through series of attacks against infrastructure and security forces

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## Targeting the TNA

### Opening of Assembly

- **Target arriving TNA members**
  - Close IZ entrances with SVBIEDs, RPG fire, SAF; disrupt / delay opening ceremonies
  - Attack convention center with mortars and rockets; make it unsafe to attend
  - Explode smuggled-in IED near convention center entrance
  - Stage violent demonstrations outside of Int'l Zone; play to international media that TNA does not represent all Iraqis
  - Call in bomb threats / increase threat reporting of attacks
- **Turn the lights off in Baghdad**
  - Even if Convention Center has power, citizens of Baghdad will be cold and in the dark
- **Conduct attacks away from Int'l Zone; emphasize that elections did nothing to improve security**
  - Attacks against Shia crowds at religious sites in Najaf or Karbala during Arbaceen
  - Attacks along ethnic fault lines; provoke sectarian violence (Kirkuk / Mosul) and force harsh government response
  - Attacks against Coalition FOBs conducting RIP/TOA—look for breakdown in security

**Create fear and insecurity in opening sessions to emphasize that while the government is controlled by Shia and Kurd collaborators, Sunni Arab insurgents can dictate security**

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## ***Targeting the Provincial Governments***

- **Attack to disrupt, delay, or deny seating of Provincial Governments**
- **Work to gain de facto control of three or more provinces**
  - Disrupt attempts at effective governance; intimidate or attack potential leaders unfriendly to the insurgency
    - Governors, mayors, police chiefs, and council members
  - Influence and intimidate population into voting against any constitution unfavorable to insurgent goals
- **Focus on 'Swing' Provinces—Ninewa and Kirkurk, where attacks and intimidation could have greatest affect on orientation and makeup of provincial governments**
  - Place insurgents into key power positions and influence policy and security
  - Provincial governments in Al Anbar and, to a lesser extent, Salah ad Din may be more easily influenced by insurgents—given high concentration of Sunni Arabs

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## *Defeating the ITG*

- **Defeat government attempts at inclusiveness and reconciliation**
  - Target Sunni 'collaborators' who participate in new government
  - Inflammate fears of Iranian control of Iraqi government
  - Portray De-Ba'athification program as Shia witch hunt against loyal Sunnis
  - Portray Shia-Kurd government policies as "Us vs Them" – anti-Sunni bias
  - Insert collaborators into key ministries—MOI, MOD, and INIS
- **Exploit divisions within the Shia / Kurd government**
  - Highlight differences between Shia Islamist agenda and Kurdish federalist requirements—attempt to drive a wedge between leading factions
  - Play on fears that any institution of a Shia version of Sharia law is a move toward Iranian-style theocracy
- **Disrupt Establishment of Rule of Law**
  - Assassinate, intimidate, or kidnap officers of the court
  - Attack and disrupt regime crimes trials
  - Attack Abu Ghraib after Coalition transitions to Bucca detention facility
- **Increase sectarian violence; capitalize on divisions in Iraqi populace**
  - Increase attacks along ethnic fault lines—Kirkuk, Mosul, Basrah, and N. Babil
  - Assassinate moderating influences—political and religious leaders
  - Incite harsh responses by Kurdish and Shia militias
  - Force Shia-led government to enact draconian security measures

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## ***Defeating the ITG***

- **Remove unifying and moderating influence of Ayatollah Sistani**
  - Continue efforts to assassinate Sistani; provoke Shia response and force government and Coalition reactions
  - Exploit divisions between ruling Shia coalition (secular vs Islamist)
  - Exploit Muqtada al Sadr; manipulate his suspicions of Coalition intentions
- **Reduce the effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces**
  - Continue attacks against ISF; focus on effective leaders
  - Attack IP stations, isolated bases, and border posts; make them too costly to maintain
  - Strike ISF where Coalition is not present; demoralize rank-and-file
  - Conduct carefully-chosen ambushes against joint Police Assistance Teams / joint Military Assistance Teams; make it too costly for Coalition to maintain
- **Defeat attempts at economic recovery**
  - Turn the lights off in Baghdad
  - Continue attacks against oil / power infrastructure
  - Attack central banking infrastructure; destabilize banking system with attacks or robberies of banks
  - Deny economic recovery to Sunni population; blame the ITG for lack of results

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## ***Insurgent Nightmares***

- Formation of a representative, inclusive, and conciliatory national government that provides effective governance for all Iraqis
- Emergence of a popular, charismatic Sunni leader working with the ITG to create an inclusive and conciliatory Iraqi government
- High-level FRE defections remove leadership and funding; huge psychological impact on insurgent rank-and-file
- Syrian crackdown on FRE; loss of safe haven and freedom of movement puts leadership at great risk
- Effective Iraqi intelligence services penetrate insurgent cells
- Effective Iraqi security forces maintain momentum of Election Day successes
- Motivated populace, building on the momentum of Election Day, gets 'off the fence' and supports ITG and ISF
- Secure environment leads to economic growth, modernized infrastructure, and improved quality of life
- Return of many former mid- to low-level Ba'athists into political and social arena
- ITG provides tribal sheikhs with money, power, and other incentives to peel away popular support for insurgency

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## ***Insurgent Assessment***

- **Insurgents will seek to regain momentum of pre-election attacks and intimidation while denying the new government the opportunity to establish itself**
- **Insurgents will continue attempts to increase the size of the insurgency by capitalizing on Sunni feelings of disenfranchisement flowing out of election results and policies of TNA and ITG**
- **Insurgents will pursue a dual-track strategy and increase attempts to use political means to infiltrate and influence new government; look for opportunities to penetrate insurgent loyalists into key military and security positions**
- **Insurgents are in the fight for the long-term, and will continue a campaign of terror and intimidation to force departure of the Coalition and the compliance of a weakened ITG**

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# Questions

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